Posts Tagged ‘ Admiral Mullen ’

Pakistani Envoy Offers to Resign Over Memo

By Salmaan Masood for The New York Times

Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, has offered to resign amid a political and diplomatic storm in Pakistan over a mysterious memo, which asks for American help in dealing with the Pakistani military and Mr. Haqqani is accused of orchestrating.

Mr. Haqqani denies any involvement with the memo, but he said he offered to resign to end the continuing controversy.

The claims that Mr. Haqqani wrote the memo were made by Mansoor Ijaz, an American citizen of Pakistani origin, who said he was asked to ensure the delivery of the document to Adm. Mike Mullen, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.

Mr. Ijaz described the memo, which he has not made public, as saying that the civilian government in Pakistan was seeking help in preventing a possible military coup in May. The military had just suffered humiliation over the American raid into Pakistan that killed Osama bin Laden.

Mr. Ijaz said that the memo indicated that Pakistan promised, in return, to dismantle a part of its premier intelligence agency — which some American officials have come to distrust.

On Wednesday, Admiral Mullen’s former spokesman, Capt. John Kirby, said that the memo was delivered, but that Admiral Mullen “did not find the memo at all credible.”

“Therefore,” Captain Kirby said, “he addressed it with no one.”

Captain Kirby added that the memo was unsigned and was delivered by someone other than Mr. Ijaz.

Supporters of Mr. Haqqani say that he maintains close contacts with American officials, including Admiral Mullen, and did not need an intermediary to deliver a message, especially one as explosive and diplomatically delicate as what was said to be included in the memo.

The controversy over the memo threatens to further aggravate the differences between Pakistan’s civilian government and the powerful military.

Many people in Pakistan view Mr. Haqqani as too close to the United States because he often pushes for closer cooperation between the countries. Before becoming ambassador, Mr. Haqqani was also a vocal critic of the military, but since taking his job he has sometimes been supportive of the military in speaking with American officials. Many in the Pakistani military view him with suspicion.

The prime minister announced this week that Mr. Haqqani had been told that he needed to return to Pakistan to answer questions about the memo.

Mr. Haqqani said the decision of whether he continued at his job or not rested with President Asif Ali Zardari.

“I do not want this nonissue of an insignificant memo written by a private individual and not considered credible by its lone recipient to undermine democracy,” Mr. Haqqani said in an e-mail.

The news of the memo first surfaced last month when Mr. Ijaz wrote an op-ed article for The Financial Times. At the time, he did not name the diplomat he said he was behind the memo. He only recently said it was Mr. Haqqani.

Thom Shanker contributed reporting from Washington, and Matthew Rosenberg from New York.

Pakistan’s Hypocrisy Has Run Its Course; It Needs A New Relationship With U.S.

By Ahmed Humayun
Best Defense department of frenemy relations

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship has long been volatile, but recent weeks have witnessed an unprecedented level of open discord between the two countries. On April 11, Lt. Gen. Ahmad Pasha, the head of Pakistan’s ISI, met with American officials and demanded that the United States sharply limit its counterterrorism efforts inside Pakistan. Just two days later the CIA launched drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas, provoking angry protests from Pakistani officials. And in a sign that Washington is determined not to back down, last week Admiral Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, publicly chastised the ISI for its “longstanding relationship” with the Haqqani network, one of the prime targets of the drone campaign.

Pakistan’s recent criticisms are partially a response to the rising public backlash against America’s counterterrorism operations. Till now, Pakistan has tacitly cooperated with the drone campaign while reluctantly permitting a few CIA agents and special operations forces to enter the country. At the same time, Islamabad has publicly denied cooperating with Washington due to domestic political sensitivities. In the aftermath of the Raymond Davis incident, however, this always-fragile pretence has become untenable. (Raymond Davis, a CIA contractor, killed two Pakistanis with possible links to the ISI in broad daylight in January. Three months later, the subsequent media frenzy has not diminished. )

No state wants its territory to be a hunting ground for covert foreign operatives. Still, the fulminations of some in Pakistan omit critical context. The Pakistani state’s ambivalent attitude towards extremist groups — acting against some while tolerating or supporting others — has forced the United States to take proactive action. The rights of sovereignty also come with duties: if Pakistan is indulgent of or incapable of acting against anti-American terrorist groups, then foreign preventive counterterrorism should be assessed more soberly by Pakistanis.

To complicate matters further, elements in Pakistan’s security establishment have deliberately stoked public sentiment. Extensive leaks to the Pakistani press about the government’s demands to the United States hint at a desire to exert pressure on Washington through exploiting populist anger. For the ISI, this diplomatic crisis is a unique opportunity to obtain long desired strategic concessions from the United States. Among other things, the ISI does not want militant groups favored by Islamabad under America’s microscope — especially those perceived to defend Pakistani interests in Afghanistan.

This is a dangerous strategy. It is premised on the mistaken assumption that the United States is unwilling to increase pressure on Pakistan. If the Pakistani government faces domestic political constraints, this is no less true of the United States. Sentiment in the U.S. Congress is already heavily tilted against Pakistan. If reports about Pakistan’s entanglement with extremist groups persist, or in the worst case scenario, an attack on the United States by a Pakistan-based terror group succeeds, Washington will find it difficult to avoid taking harsh actions. Loose talk by some Pakistani politicians about cutting off supply routes to U.S. forces in Afghanistan is similarly self-defeating. It is in Pakistan’s long-term interests to prevent an irrevocable rupture with the United States.

At the same time, Washington should appraise the scope of its direct counterterrorism drive within the broader effort to stabilize Pakistan. According to U.S. officials, the drone campaign has been remarkably successful in weakening militant networks; in private, some Pakistani military and political leaders also acknowledge the program’s efficacy. That may be the case, but displays of U.S. coercive force on Pakistani soil — especially those involving U.S. personnel on the ground — have also accentuated the most extreme tendencies in that country’s public discourse. They have empowered those in Pakistan who maintain that the war on terror is America’s war, not Pakistan’s struggle, and that the United States has fundamentally hostile aims towards Pakistan.

Policymakers might shrug their shoulders at conspiracy theories. That would be short-sighted. The fact is that the United States cannot directly extinguish the threat posed by Pakistan-based terrorism. U.S. forces can certainly kill a few extremists through drone strikes or ground operations. But the militant threat is geographically dispersed: not only do insurgent sanctuaries infest the isolated border regions, terrorist networks are also embedded in the heavily populated areas of the Punjabi heartland. Some of these groups have deep roots stretching back decades and enjoy local political cover. Kinetic action by a deeply unpopular foreign power will not uproot them.

The single most decisive factor in disrupting Pakistani militancy will be the willingness of the state and society to commit to a long-term struggle. Only Pakistan can overcome the jihadi Frankenstein it has spawned through a combination of stepped up military force, political dialogue, and local governance. The impact of U.S. policies on the internal Pakistani debate about militancy should therefore be factored heavily into Washington’s policymaking calculus.

Pakistan is making progress — however halting or incomplete — in adopting a more robust anti-militant posture. Since 2009, its military offensives in the tribal areas have degraded insurgent sanctuaries at a heavy price in blood and treasure. Pakistani intelligence has also helped the United States capture numerous high-level al Qaeda operatives. The Obama administration’s economic assistance to Pakistan and its diplomatic efforts to stabilize the country’s fractious politics have contributed to these advances. Going forward, the core policy challenge is to generate the political will inside Pakistan that will expand these activities. Right now, Washington’s ability to do so is vitiated by Pakistani paranoia.

In the short term, Islamabad and Washington need to negotiate a new counterterrorism relationship. The old strategy of ambiguous private compromise veiled by public dissembling has run its course. Pakistan’s legitimate concerns should be weighed against the immediate threat to the American homeland and to U.S. forces in Afghanistan. This is a herculean task given the underlying strategic differences, but the alternative is likely to be much starker.

Ahmed Humayun is a fellow at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) and senior analyst at Georgetown University’s Emerging Threats Project. He can be reached at ahmed.a.humayun@gmail.com .

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